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2006:  A Year of Transition at the Federal Reserve 
 
 
  Good afternoon, everyone, and thanks for inviting me to speak to you today.  I’m going 
to keep my prepared remarks brief, so that we’ll have plenty of time for your questions and 
comments.   
  As you know, 2006 is a year of significant transition for the Federal Reserve.  At the end 
of this month, Alan Greenspan is stepping down as Chairman after 18 years of distinguished 
service, and Ben Bernanke will then, in all likelihood, have been confirmed by the Senate and 
will therefore be in a position to become the new Chairman.  So this seemed like a natural time 
to spend a few moments looking back at the Greenspan Fed and giving you some of my views on 
what may lie ahead under a “Bernanke Fed.” 
  Alan Greenspan has won many plaudits for skillfully managing monetary policy—and 
deservedly so.  During the Greenspan years, the U.S. economy has been extraordinarily stable, 
with just two mild and short recessions, and with low and stable inflation for over a decade.  
Clearly, in the short time I have today, I cannot do justice to all the accomplishments, 
innovations, and successes the Fed has achieved under his leadership.  So I’ll focus on two 
aspects of policy that I believe have been especially important to this sterling record—a 
systematic, and therefore understandable and predictable approach to policy, and a growing 
emphasis on communication and transparency. 
  I will focus first on what I mean by a systematic approach to policy.  While the Fed does 
not follow a policy rule, it has been consistent in its approach to achieving its dual mandate—  2 
keeping inflation low and stable and promoting maximum sustainable employment.  For 
example, when faced with an unwelcome increase in inflation, the Fed has consistently 
engineered a strong funds rate response.  Indeed, at times, the Fed has taken preemptive 
measures, shooting inflation before it “sees the whites of its eyes;” for example, in 1994, it raised 
the funds rate aggressively in response to indicators suggesting that demand had exceeded 
capacity in labor and product markets, even though inflation itself had not shown much of a rise.  
Likewise, when faced with an unemployment rate that diverges from our best estimates of so-
called “full” employment, the Fed’s response also has been consistent and strong.  Consider the 
start of the 1990s, when the unemployment rate was rising—even though inflation was some 
distance from price stability, the Fed chose to ease policy. 
This systematic, consistent approach has enhanced the ability of financial markets to 
anticipate the Fed’s response to economic developments and to respond themselves in advance 
of the Fed.  Such market responses strengthen and speed the transmission of policy to the 
economy and conceivably enhance economic stability.  Moreover, a systematic, consistent 
approach helps build the public’s confidence in the Fed’s commitment to low and stable 
inflation; this confidence, in turn, may well make it easier for the Fed to respond to fluctuations 
in labor and product markets, because there is less risk that an easing of policy will unleash a 
wave of inflation fears. 
  As successful as this systematic approach has been, I should note that it has by no means 
been a straitjacket for policy during the Greenspan years.  Rather, policy also has been flexible 
when unusual circumstances called for it.  Let me give just one example.  In the latter part of the 
1990s, the Greenspan Fed—and Greenspan in particular—was quick to spot the productivity 
surge and to realize that it meant that the unemployment rate could be significantly lower than   3 
previously thought, for a time, at least, without igniting inflation.  This led to a policy of 
“forbearance,” capturing the benefits of lower unemployment while continuing to move toward 
price stability. 
  Now let me turn to the second aspect of policy, namely, the increased emphasis on 
communication and transparency.  One of the first steps in this direction occurred in 1994, when 
the FOMC began issuing press releases after its meetings that explicitly announced changes in 
the federal funds rate target.  Over the decade or so since then, the press release has come to 
include a statement about the balance of risks to the attainment of its dual mandate, and at least 
some indication of where policy may go in the future.  This enhanced transparency works in 
tandem with the systematic approach I discussed, because it, too, helps the markets anticipate the 
Fed’s response to economic developments. 
A good example of this was the threat of outright deflation in 2003.  The FOMC wanted 
policy to err on the side of accommodation until the threat had passed.  With Japan’s unfortunate 
experience in the 1990s as a clear object lesson, the Committee believed that the costs of slipping 
into deflation would be worse than the costs of a bit of over-stimulation to economic activity.  
This risk management approach to policy was communicated to the public when the FOMC 
statement said, “In these circumstances, the Committee believes that policy accommodation can 
be maintained for a considerable period.”  This forward-looking language itself seems to have 
helped keep long-term interest rates low, thereby minimizing the risk of deflation. 
  Of course, there have certainly been other developments in policy during the 18 years of 
Greenspan’s chairmanship that have contributed to its success in achieving its dual mandate.  But 
I believe these two—a systematic approach to policy and more communication and   4 
transparency—are particularly noteworthy.  They have helped strengthen public confidence in 
the Fed and thereby helped anchor inflation expectations to price stability. 
  These achievements provide a great foundation for the new Chairman, Ben Bernanke.  
Having observed him when he was a member of the Board of Governors from 2002 to 2005, and 
being familiar with his remarkable body of research on macroeconomic policy, I feel pretty 
confident that he places an equally high value on a systematic approach as well as on 
transparency and communication.  Indeed, he has stressed that clear communications about the 
central bank's approach, its objectives, and its assessment of the economy are necessary to reduce 
uncertainty and stabilize expectations. And any of you who have read the speeches he gave while 
he was a Governor will know that he is a consummate communicator and teacher.  
  One area where he has differed with Chairman Greenspan is on how to define “price 
stability.” Of course, both see price stability as a prime objective of policy.  But for Chairman 
Greenspan, the definition has been behavioral—that is, he would say that we have achieved price 
stability when inflation is low enough that it does not affect people’s economic decisions.  In 
contrast, well before Bernanke was nominated to be Fed Chairman, he said that he would like to 
see the establishment of a numerical objective for price stability.  If you’re interested in getting a 
full articulation of his views, I’d recommend you take a look at a speech he gave in October 
2003 at a conference at the St. Louis Fed.
1  Since his nomination, he has said that he would not 
institute such an approach without a consensus among FOMC members. 
  For my part, I’m sympathetic to the idea of a quantitative objective for price stability, as I 
agree that it enhances both Fed transparency and accountability.  I have previously articulated 
my views on this.  I see an inflation rate between 1 and 2 percent, as measured by the core 
                                                 
1 Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke at the 28th Annual Policy Conference: Inflation Targeting: Prospects and 
Problems, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Missouri, October 17, 2003.  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2003/20031017/default.htm   5 
personal consumption expenditures price index, as an appropriate price stability objective for the 
Fed.  However, I also think it is critically important that a numerical inflation objective not 
weaken our commitment to a dual mandate that includes full employment.  Therefore, I would 
see the numerical objective as a long-run goal, and would want the Committee to have a flexible 
timeframe within which to maintain it.  We’ve done a good job under Chairman Greenspan of 
promoting both price stability and full employment.  I believe that a numerical long-run 
objective for inflation will enhance our ability to maintain that success even in the face of the 
significant challenges that may come up.  
  Let me wrap things up by saying that I hope these brief remarks have given you some 
appreciation of the remarkable achievements of the Greenspan Fed over nearly two decades and 
a glimpse into some issues that may arise in the “Bernanke Fed.”  As a member of the FOMC, of 
course, I am going to be “at the table,” and in the thick of the transition.  It particularly pleases 
me to say that, with the Fed’s increased emphasis on communication and transparency, you and 
the rest of the public are going to have a pretty good view of how things play out yourselves.  So 
stay tuned—I think it’s going to be a fascinating year for us all! 
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